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Abstract 
Hospitals, as data custodians, have the need to share a version of the data in hand with external research institutes 
for analysis purposes. For preserving the privacy of the patients, anonymization methods are employed to 
produce a modified version of data for publishing; these methodologies shall not reveal the patient’s information 
while maintaining the utility of data. In this article, we propose a practical methodology for anonymization of 
structured health data based on cryptographic algorithms, which preserves the privacy by construction. Our initial 








Hospitals, nowadays, are increasingly collecting data from 
patients as it allows to provide better treatment and precise 
diagnosis. Analyzing such data by sharing it with 
researchers can be useful for society. However, the shared 
data should not compromise the privacy of the individuals. 
Removing the identifier fields like name and address, is not 
enough for preserving privacy from certain attacks, e.g., 
linking attack [1]. Such attacks can re-identify the 
individuals and reveal specific information based on the 
raw data. One solution to this is that the data custodians, 
e.g., hospitals, anonymize such data before sharing. 
1.1 Anonymization 
Having access to high-quality data is a necessity for 
medical and pharmaceutical experts and researchers for 
facilitating decision making. Sharing healthcare data can 
benefit several parties, including hospitals, medical and 
pharmaceutical researchers outside the hospital, patients, 
and data mining researchers. Hospitals, more precisely, 
medical experts and researchers, can make use of the result 
of data analysis performed by external research centers. 
Medical practitioners and pharmaceutical researchers 
outside the hospital need the data for analysis leading to 
informed decision making. Patients, indirectly through this, 
will receive better services from hospitals and medical 
centers outside the hospital. Finally, data mining 
researchers will have access to real health data and use 
them as benchmarks for their methods. However, raw 
health data contains patients’ sensitive information and can 
compromise their privacy. Therefore, health data holders 
are looking for anonymization techniques that prepare the 
health data for release, while keeping the quality of data and 
preserving the privacy of patients. 
Patients consider hospitals as trustworthy entities, so they 
are willing to share their data with hospitals. Nevertheless, 
this trust is not transitive to other entities such as research 
 
centers outside the hospitals. Many believe that removing 
specific identifying information including name, telephone, 
and social security number, is sufficient for releasing the 
data. As several previous studies show [1, 2], merely 
removing the identifier fields is deficient for preserving the 
privacy of individuals. Sweeney [1] shows, an adversary by 
having limited information from an individual, say from 
another dataset, can match other attributes, called quasi- 
identifiers (QID), and reidentify the individual. Three 
prominent examples about this are provided in [1, 3-6, 7]. 
At some points, hospitals, instead of analyzing the data by 
themselves and sharing the analysis results, e.g., statistics 
or classifiers, need to share the data with external research 
centers, e.g., universities and pharmaceutical companies, in 
order to make use of other professional resources outside. 
Therefore, they should share the data with external 
researchers specialist in data analysis. Moreover, having 
the data give much freedom to external research centers for 
data analysis. Frequent requests from hospitals for 
providing statistical information and fine-tuning the data 
mining results is not feasible [2]. 
1.2 Motivational Example 
Hospitals are considered to be the trusted party, and thus 
have access to the raw data. However, they, in general have 
limited resources for some specific data analyses. 
Therefore, it is common to delegate the analysis process to 
external research institutions. To preserve privacy of 
individuals, data should be anonymized in the hospitals, 
and only anonymized data can be shared with external 
institutions or released to the public. Note that any party 
external to hospitals can be the adversary, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
After analyzing the published data, the results will be 
released to the hospital, which can be, for instance, a 
discriminator function as the outcome of the learning from 
anonymized data. With this function, the hospital can 
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classify new raw records as follows: firstly, the new record 
should be anonymized in the same way as the published 
data anonymized; secondly, the new anonymized record 
can be passed to discriminator function, shared by the 
external institutions, for classification. In this way, 
hospitals can make use of services outside without 
compromising the privacy of their patients. 
 
 
Figure 1 medical data anonymization and analysis. 
In this paper, we propose a methodology to anonymize 
structured health data based on cryptographic algorithms 
and without assumptions on the characteristics of the 
encryption method. Adopting cryptographic algorithms 
guarantees privacy preservation by construction. 
Moreover, the comparison results of the data utility 
between raw and anonymized data generated based on our 
proposed methodology and the existing methods are 
promising. The proposed methodology can have a 
complementary role in combination with previous methods 
as well. 
The organization of the rest of this article is as follows. In 
Section 2, a short review of previous methods for 
anonymization of the structured data is provided. Section 3 
addresses the proposed approach for anonymization, along 
with providing some preliminary information. Section 4 
presents the necessary information and settings concerning 
the experiments. Section 5 is devoted to the evaluation and 
experimental results. Finally, in Section 6, conclusions and 
future research directions are provided. 
2 RELATED WORKS 
For research purposes, data custodians need to release a 
version of data in a way that individuals cannot be re- 
identified. Statistical and multi-level databases are among 
the other approaches for addressing these kinds of needs. 
Despite the assumption made in [1], statistical disclosure 
control [8] is an active research area for addressing today's 
needs to provide accurate information while protecting the 
privacy of the various parties involved [9, 10]. On the other 
hand, anonymization techniques are between other 
solutions in this regard. For sharing the data records, 
microdata, in anonymization, we try to irreversibly alter the 
personal data until the re-identification of data subjects is 
no longer possible [11]. 
Anonymization methods provide a new class of acceptable 
solutions to this problem. Typically, anonymization 
techniques for structured data make use of generalization 
method. More specifically, such techniques modify or 
generalized the data records components in a way that a 
data record is hardly distinguishable from others. Some 
important related studies are k-anonymity [1], l-diversity 
[12], t-closeness [13], and LKC-privacy [2]. To date, k- 
anonymity remains the most widely known privacy model 
for anonymization during the past two decades. To thwart 
privacy threats, k-anonymity privacy model generalizes 
and suppresses data record components or features into 
equivalence groups so that any record is indistinguishable 
from at least k other data records [14, 2]. However, in this 
method, when the dimensionality of data is high, most of 
the data must be generalized or suppressed for achieving k- 
anonymity; this negatively affects the utility of data and 
degrades it [2]. Other methods try to rectify the issue, for 
instance, by imposing limitations on the problem, such as 
the supposition of limited knowledge of the adversary 
about the patient. For example, in the LKC-privacy model, 
the adversary is supposed to have only the values for a part 
of the QID attributes of the victim’s record, L attributes [2]. 
The proposed approach in this study described in Section 3 
tries to provide a solution for the above problem, i.e., 
anonymization of structured data. The problem here is the 
same as the one described in the above research studies, 
while we formally define the problem in Section 3. The 
proposed approach of this study for the solution is 
completely different from that provided in the previous 
studies. This study investigates the application of 
cryptographic algorithms, which is distinguishing from 
previous works. The majority of previous studies consider 
performing machine learning over homomorphically- 
encrypted data [15-18], while in this paper we do not make 
such assumptions. 
3 METHOD 
In this section, we first define the anonymization problem 
and then propose a practical solution to this problem. Two 
main concerns for data anonymization is privacy 
preservation and data utility, discussed in the following 
subsection. There is often an inherent trade-off between 
these two metrics. At one extreme, all data can be released, 
for maximizing the utility, and as a result, violate the 
privacy entirely. On the other extreme, releasing no data 
can maximize privacy; however, there would be no data 
utility [14]. The proposed methodology in this section 
provides an approach for addressing this problem, which is 
based on cryptography for data anonymization. 
3.1 Problem Definition 
In the following two subsections we discuss the two criteria 
for this problem. We define the anonymization problem as 
guaranteeing the privacy while maximizing the utility of 
the data for the statistical and machine learning data 
analysis. 
Privacy Preservation 
This section explains the privacy threats for sharing the raw 
information through an example; there exist two types of 
privacy concerns, namely identity linkage and attribute 
linkage. Table 1 shows the raw patient data. The raw data 
does not have the identifier features but is still vulnerable 
to the violation of privacy. Education, sex, and age are 
quasi-identifying attributes [1]. Disorder is the sensitive 
feature that the adversary does not know about the victim 
patient and tries to infer it. Finally, there exists one class for 
every record in the dataset. 
Based on the following assumptions about the adversary, 
there are two types of privacy concerns to address. As 
mentioned in Introduction, the adversary is assumed to 
have anonymous data for all the patients. Moreover, the 
adversary has parts of the victim patient’s record, in its raw 
format; this information is part of or all the quasi- 
identifying attributes and is only for one patient. The extent 
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3.2 The Anonymization Method 
For the preservation of privacy, we seek a function to map 
each unique record of raw data to another unique record, 
different from the raw record and in the same feature space. 
The anonymized data records must be different enough to 
prevent identity and attribute attacks. The anonymized data 
must not allow the possibility for the adversary to map back 
to the raw data. Therefore, the utilized function for mapping 
       the raw data must not be reversible, or in other words must 
Table 1 An example of raw data table. 
of adversary’s information about the victim patient is 
assumed differently in different studies. For instance, in [1] 
the author for k-anonymity model assumes that the 
adversary has all the values for quasi-identifying attributes, 
but in [2] in LKC-privacy model limits the adversary’s 
information to only the values of L number of the quasi- 
identifying attributes. Finally, the adversary does not know 
about the sensitive information of the victim and is willing 
to infer it. Accordingly, hospitals face two common privacy 
concerns [2] described below: 
• Identity Disclosure: If the record is highly specific, 
matching the records with the victim’s information is 
simple, which lead to the inference of the patient’s 
sensitive information. For instance, in Table 1, the raw 
data table, if the adversary knows that the victim’s 
education and age are 'MSc' and '31', respectively, then 
s/he confidently identifies that record number 5 is the 
victim’s and infers that the victim’s disorder is 
'Bipolar'. 
• Attribute Disclosure: If with some quasi-identifying 
attributes, the sensitive value happens repeatedly, it 
makes the inference of the sensitive value easy, 
although the accurate data record of the victim is not 
identifiable. For instance, in Table 1, the raw data 
table, if the adversary knows that the victim’s sex and 
age are 'F' and '40', respectively, then, s/he can match 
the victim’s information to records number 1 and 3. 
However, since both sensitive values for record 
number 1 and 3 are the same, 'Depression', then, the 
adversary can infer with 100% confidence that the 
victim’s disorder is 'Depression'. 
Utility of Data 
To make sure that the anonymization method is not 
degrading the utility of the data, a comparison of the utility 
of raw data with the anonymous data is essential. The 
classification performance is a valid criterion for making a 
comparison between the utility of data before and after 
anonymization. Since the main concern of this study is 
sharing the data for data mining purposes, the difference 
between the classification performance for the raw and 
anonymized data shows the excellence and efficiency of the 
algorithm. 
Information gain [19] is another criterion that indicates how 
much a method may degrade or improve the data quality 
for every feature of the data individually. Information gain 
was first introduced for decision trees and is based on the 
information entropy [20]. Nevertheless, since it does not 
consider the correlation and combination of the attributes, 
it is not as reliable as the classification performance 
criterion. 
be one-way, for those with whom the anonymized data will 
be shared. 
Cryptography fulfills the privacy objectives by 
construction. Mapping a number to another unique number 
through one-way functions is the main purpose of 
cryptography. Therefore, by such intrinsic features of 
cryptographic algorithms, we can make sure of the 
preservation of privacy criterion without taking further 
actions. Since, after encryption, the values would be 
meaningless numbers for the adversary, and it is not 
possible for one without a key to map back to the raw data. 
Due to the objective of this study for anonymization of the 
structured health data containing categorical and numerical 
features, encryption is entirely feasible. Since in both cases 
there are numbers, more precisely category numbers and 
numerical values, which are mapped to other numbers. The 
sensitive attribute is not an exception and is encrypted as 
well. Normalization of data is the second phase of 
anonymization. Normalization, in addition to the positive 
impact on learning, reinforces preserving the privacy as this 
is a hashing phase after encryption. 
As described earlier the anonymization methods should 
fulfill two criteria, namely privacy preservation and data 
utility. Application of cryptographic algorithms guarantees 
the privacy preservation criterion by construction. 
However, we also need to make sure about the performance 
of this methodology in regard to the utility of data. In this 
study, we experimentally show that our proposed 
methodology for anonymization of structured data is also 
efficient regarding the data utility. 
The utility of the data needs to be preserved and this is 
related to the correlation of attributes and labels in data 
samples and the algebraic distance of samples from each 
other. To ensure satisfying this criterion after encryption 
and normalization of the dataset, the utility of the data is 
compared before and after anonymization based on two 
measurements described previously in this section. If the 
results for raw and anonymized data are close, then in 
addition to the preservation of the privacy, there also would 
be a confidence about the utility of data. A loss to a limited 
extent in the utility of data is acceptable as there exists a 
trade-off between privacy and data utility in data 
anonymization [14]. 
4 EVALUATION SETUP 
4.1 Dataset for Evaluation of the Methodology 
Adult dataset [21] is the de facto benchmark for evaluation 
of anonymization models [2, 12, 22-27]. In this dataset, the 
samples belong to two different classes; the rates of the 
positive and negative classes are 76.07% and 23.93%. The 
total number of records is 48842 (train=32561, 
test=16281), and the train and test sets were separated when 
 Quasi-identifier (QID) Sensitive  
ID Education Sex Age Disorder Class 
1 BSc F 40 Depression cat. #1 
2 MSc M 53 ADHD cat. #1 
3 HS-grad F 40 Depression cat. #2 
4 PhD F 31 Social Anxiety cat. #1 
5 MSc M 31 Bipolar cat. #2 
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shared. Each record has 14 attributes, including eight 
categorical and six numerical ones. Furthermore, the 
dataset contains missing values. This study considers all the 
attributes as QID, although it is possible to suppose part of 
them as QID, like in [2] which considers marital-status as 
sensitive and others as QID attributes. 
4.2 Encryption Algorithms 
For the evaluation of the proposed approach, four 
cryptographic algorithms, including two from symmetric 
and two from asymmetric encryption systems, are 
considered. The symmetric algorithms are Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) and Data Encryption Standard 
(DES); the input and output data and key size for each is 
128 and 64 bits, respectively. The Asymmetric algorithms 
are RivestShamirAdleman (RSA) and ElGamal, which 
both are also homomorphic over multiplication. The key 
size for each is 2048 and 1024 bits, respectively. All the 
keys are generated randomly for every iteration of 
experiments, based on the toolbox. 
4.3 Comparison with K-Anonymity 
In order to evaluate the results of our methodology, a 
comparison between the results of the proposed and former 
methods of anonymization is necessary. K-anonymity is 
one of the most popular privacy models. In [28], the authors 
propose Mondrian for obtaining k-anonymity. This study 
considers this work for anonymizing the data based on the 
k-anonymity model for comparison with the proposed 
methodology. The corresponding parameters for these 
methods are k, set of QID, and the mode of the algorithm, 
which can be either relaxed or strict. In the experiments, k 
is set to 10 and QID are set to all the attributes, and the 
results for both relaxed and strict modes are provided. 
4.4 Utility Measure 
Two measures employed here for evaluation of data utility 
are information gain and classification performance. 
Information gain is based on information entropy and is 
being used to evaluate how well an attribute alone predicts 
the classes for samples in comparison to other attributes. In 
other words, every attribute is used to categorize samples, 
then the information entropy of the classes of the 
categorized samples are calculated. The lower the entropy 
of the samples’ classes in each category of samples 
categorized based on that specific attribute, the higher the 
information gain of that attribute. The loss of information 
gain after anonymization can indicate the extent of 
deterioration of data. However, since this measure does not 
consider the combination of attributes, it is not as reliable 
as classification performance. For calculation of 
classification performance, we used the geometric mean of 
the ratios of correctly classified samples to the number of 
samples in that particular class. Geometric mean is the only 
correct average for normalized measurement [29]. 
5 EVALUATION RESULTS 
To evaluate the efficiency of our proposed methodology, 
the Adult dataset [21] is anonymized with the proposed 
methodology by this paper. Afterward, the information gain 
and classification performance for raw and anonymized 
data are calculated and recorded for comparison and 
evaluation. The closer the results of raw and anonymized 
data the higher our confidence to the anonymization 
methodology regarding the preservation of data utility. 
As mentioned earlier, after one level of encryption, we need 
to normalize the data in order to obtain the anonymized 
data. The normalization method used for our experiments 
is min-max normalization: 
 
𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  = 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥 , 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
(1) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the normalized value of 𝑥𝑥, the encrypted 
number, and 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 are respectively minimum and 
maximum values of the corresponding column in the matrix 
of encrypted numbers. 
Furthermore, for more certainty, the experiments for every 
method iterates for ten times, and the average results are 
measured. In every, iteration the key for encryption 
algorithms are generated separately and randomly, to 
ensure the classification results are independent of the keys. 
5.1 Information Gain 
The encryption is particularly useful when the attribute is 
numerical since, concerning the learning results, encryption 
of the number of categories is similar to mapping each 
specific category number to another random number 
specific for that category; therefore, for such attributes, 
encryption is not a necessary process. However, in this 
study’s experiments, we encrypted all the attributes and 
normalized the data afterward. Before and after 
anonymization by this methodology, the information gain 
of categorical attributes always remains the same, because 
of the characteristics of this measure, so there would be no 
points in reporting them here. 
Table 2 presents the information gain of the numerical 
attributes of raw and anonymized datasets; the results are 
from the average for ten independent iterations. The results 
in this table show that our anonymization methodology 
does not reduce the information gain of the numerical 
attribute unless in attributes 1 and 13, albeit negligible. 
Considering the information gain, the proposed 
methodology preserves the utility of data to a considerable 
extent. 
5.2 Classification Performance 
In addition to the anonymization with the proposed 
methodology of this paper, for comparison, we also 
anonymized the Adult dataset with Mondrian 
multidimensional k-anonymity approach [28]. Then, the 
results of these methods, along with the raw dataset, are 
used for learning a classification function. The learning 
algorithm used in this research is the random forest 
algorithm [30]. The training and testing sets for the raw data 
and anonymized data based on our proposed methodology 
are the same as published in [21]. However, for Mondrian 
multidimensional k-anonymity approach for every 
iteration, we take 70% of randomly shuffled data as the 
training set and the remaining 30% as the testing set; 
splitting the train and test sets for learning and evaluation 
in this setting is conventional and valid, considering the 
studies in the field [31]. 
Table 3 exhibits the classification performance based on the 
geometric mean measure, i.e., geometric mean of the ratios 
of correctly classified samples to the number of samples in 
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DATASET INFORMATION GAIN 
Attribute 1 Attribute 3 Attribute 5 Attribute 11 Attribute 12 Attribute 13 
Raw Data 0.09754 0 0.09328 0.11452 0.05072 0.05814 
Anonymized Data (RSA Alg.) 0.096839 0 0.093379 0.118778 0.051108 0.057001 
Anonymized Data (ElGamal Alg.) 0.097563 0 0.093507 0.118503 0.05157 0.056479 
Anonymized Data (DES Alg.) 0.096581 0 0.093452 0.118688 0.051163 0.05713 
Anonymized Data (AES Alg.) 0.096755 0 0.093434 0.118512 0.051061 0.057325 
Table 2 Information Gain for numerical attributes of the Adult dataset [21] before and after anonymization. 
that particular class, for raw and anonymized data obtained 
adopting several methods. All the results in Table 3 are the 
average of the results of ten independent iterations. The 
information gain table provided in this article is calculated 
using WEKA software [32]. The difference between the 
classification performance of anonymized data based on our 
methodology and the raw data is less than 3%; our proposed 
methodology, however, outperforms Mondrian 
multidimensional k-anonymity regarding classification 
performance for adult dataset as the results show that the 
geometric mean measure for our anonymization approach, 




Raw Data 75.37 
Anonymized Data (K-Anonymity Mondrian 
[21], Relaxed, K=10, QI = Attribute 1-14) 
67.87 
Anonymized Data (K-Anonymity Mondrian 
[21], Strict, K=10, QI = Attribute 1-14) 
68.08 
Anonymized Data (RSA Alg.) 73.30 
Anonymized Data (ElGamal Alg.) 73.59 
Anonymized Data (DES Alg.) 73.22 
Anonymized Data (AES Alg.) 73.57 
Table 3 Classification performance based on geometric 
mean for all methods for Adult dataset [21]. 
The results in Tables 2 and 3 show that our proposed 
methodology only deteriorates the data to a negligible extent 
depending on the application; this is justifiable as there 
exists a cost for preserving the privacy of individuals. A 
comparison between the classification results of the 
anonymized data obtained by our proposed methodology 
and Mondrian multidimensional k-anonymity approach, in 
Table 3, indicates that our methodology outperforms theirs 
as the prediction results, with the same learning algorithm, 
are more accurate. Moreover, the results suggest that 
maintaining the utility of data is not dependent on a specific 
cryptographic algorithm. 
Comparisons of two data utility measures for raw and 
anonymized data show that this methodology preserves the 
relations of values in the data table to a considerable extent. 
Therefore, analyses dependent on the relations of the data 
attributes to each other, and the labels are feasible and 
supported, e.g., learning tasks through machine learning 
algorithms. Such analyses are not dependent on the exact 
values in raw data since the anonymization changes the 
range of values for each attribute. The anonymized data is a 
matrix of numbers, likewise to the raw data, and it can be 
used the same way as the raw data. Moreover, regarding the 
privacy concerns described in the Problem Definition 
Section, if one manages to change the values in the raw data 
until the adversary cannot map it back to the original values, 
then the desired purpose is achieved. Using cryptographic 
algorithms for anonymization along with the fundamental 
property of these algorithms, i.e., mapping numbers by one- 
way injective functions, dismisses the described privacy 
concerns, in other words, matching data values from what 
the adversary has and what is published as anonymized data 
is not possible. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this study, we investigated the approach of anonymizing 
the structured health data by utilizing cryptographic 
algorithms, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first 
application of these algorithms in anonymization. 
Anonymization methods must fulfill two criteria, namely 
privacy preservation and data utility. We evaluated the 
presented methodology on the de facto benchmark dataset 
for anonymization. The results are promising and indicate 
that such an approach may be employed in real-world 
applications by the healthcare sector. However, similar to 
the majority of anonymization techniques, our proposed 
methodology impacts the quality of data mining results, 
even though we have shown that this degradation is less than 
the previous works in the data anonymization domain. This 
methodology is particularly practical for anonymizing the 
data for data mining applications. For future works, the 
applicability of this approach may be investigated for 
unstructured types of health data, e.g., physiological signals. 
Moreover, automatic de-identification of clinical notes and 
overcoming the particular challenges is another closely 
related research area that can be tied up with natural 
language processing [33, 34]. Further studies on the field 
mentioned above would be analogous to this study and 
worthwhile. 
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